By following the analysis of De Caro and Garuccio [Phys. Rev. A 54, 174 (1996)], we show that the factorable state vector produced with a beam-splitter set on the paths of parametric down-converted photons violates some new inequalities that we deduce from local realism. These inequalities are more stringent than those used up to now in the discussion of such phenomena.

Los trabajos que componen este libro se adentran en eso que ha llegado a verse como un campo de estudio asegurado, pero que más bien parece un arco en problemática tensión: el que se forma al pretender conjuntar la fenomenología “y” la hermenéutica. La particularidad de Heidegger consiste tanto en haber tensado ese arco como en haber abandonado después su propio intento, tan fructífero para otros. Por ello, Heidegger es −junto a Gadamer− el interlocutor principal de estos escritos. El libro (...) tiene como objetivo homenajear a Franco Volpi por todo lo que nos dio como pensador y persona. Da a conocer uno de los últimos trabajos del propio Volpi, así como ensayos de Jean Grondin, Arturo Leyte, Ramón Rodríguez, Alejandro Vigo y Ángel Xolocotzi, entre otros. (shrink)

1. Le fe por la palabra -- 2. Topía y Utopía -- 3. Luz en la caverna.

Computer simulations have conventionally been understood to be either extensions of formal methods such as mathematical models or as special cases of empirical practices such as experiments. Here, I argue that computer simulations are best understood as instruments. Understanding them as such can better elucidate their actual role as well as their potential epistemic standing in relation to science and other scientific methods, practices and devices.

In this paper I argue that Artificial Intelligence and the many data science methods associated with it, such as machine learning and large language models, are first and foremost epistemic technologies. In order to establish this claim, I first argue that epistemic technologies can be conceptually and practically distinguished from other technologies in virtue of what they are designed for, what they do and how they do it. I then proceed to show that unlike other kinds of technology (_including_ other (...) epistemic technologies) AI can be uniquely positioned as an epistemic technology in that it is primarily designed, developed and deployed to be used in _epistemic contexts_ such as inquiry, it is specifically designed, developed and deployed to manipulate _epistemic content_ such as data, _and_ it is designed, developed and deployed to do so particularly through _epistemic operations_ such as prediction and analysis. As has been shown in recent work in the philosophy and ethics of AI (Alvarado, AI and Ethics, 2022a), understanding AI as an epistemic technology will also have significant implications for important debates regarding our relationship to AI technologies. This paper includes a brief overview of such implications, particularly those pertaining to explainability, opacity, trust and even epistemic harms related to AI technologies. (shrink)

The Tattvapaplavasimha is a philosophical text unique of its kind it is the only text of the Carvaka Lokayata school which has survived and the only Sanskrit work in which full-fledged scepticism is propounded. Notwithstanding that it has been hitherto almost completely ignored. The present book consists of an introduction detailed analysis edition translation with extensive notes of the first half of the text. In the introduction Jayarasi`s affiliation to the Lokayata school is reassessed and his place in the historical (...) development of Indian Philosophy evaluated. New evidence for the dating of Jayarasi is examined and a new dating is suggested. (shrink)

Introduction: Cartographies in becoming -- The happy depression -- Integrated world capitalism -- Planetary psychopathia -- Postmediatic affect -- User's manual-- Deleuze and the rhizomatic machine -- Why is anti-Oedipus the book of the '68 movement? -- Kafka, hypertext, and assemblages -- The tantric egg -- Chaosmosis -- The provisional eternity of friendship.

Bioethics, Volume 36, Issue 2, Page 121-133, February 2022.

In this detailed study of the republican tradition in the development of the Enlightenment, the central problem of utopia and reform is crystallized in a discussion of the right to punish. Describing the political situation in Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the author shows how the old republics in Italy, Poland and Holland stagnated and were unable to survive in the age of absolutism. The Philosophes discussed the ideal of republicanism against this background. They were particularly influenced by (...) the political and religious radicalism of John Toland, which had survived the English Restoration and was then reaching Europe. Professor Venturi traces the debate on the penal laws and the attempt to relate utopian ideas of society to the practical problem of dealing with man in society, which culminated in the assertion by many Philosophes that an unjust social system necessitated harsh penal laws, thereby rejecting the possibility of reform. (shrink)

It is widely supposed that evolutionary debunking arguments against morality constitute a type of epistemological objection to our moral beliefs. In particular, the debunking force of such arguments is not supposed to depend on the metaphysical claim that moral facts do not exist. In this paper I argue that this standard epistemological construal of EDAs is highly misleading, if not mistaken. Specifically, I argue that the most widely discussed EDAs all make key and controversial metaphysical claims about the nature of (...) morality or the possibility of moral truth that belie their apparently epistemological character. I show that the debunking force of these EDAs derives largely from metaphysical claims about morality and their implications for the possibility of moral reduction, rather than from epistemological worries associated with the existence of an causal/non-moral explanation of our moral judgments. The paper briefly concludes with a dilemma that I believe confronts all EDAs such as those discussed in this paper: either such arguments are unsound, or else they prove too much, debunking our knowledge of science and the external world, as well as morality. (shrink)

A ‘companions in guilt’ strategy against moral error theory aims to show that the latter proves too much: if sound, it supports an implausible error-theoretic conclusion in other areas such as epistemic or practical reasoning. Christopher Cowie [2016 Cowie, C. 2016. Good News for Moral Error Theorists: A Master Argument Against Companions in Guilt Strategies, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94/1: 115–30.[Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] [Google Scholar]] has recently produced what he claims is a ‘master argument’ against (...) all such strategies. The essence of his argument is that CG arguments cannot work because they are afflicted by internal incoherence or inconsistency. I argue, first, that Cowie's master argument does not succeed. Beyond this, I argue that there is no good reason to think that any such argument—one that purports to identify an internal incoherence in CG arguments—can succeed. Second, I argue that the main substantive area of disagreement between error theorists and CG theorists essentially concerns the conceptual profile of epistemic reasons—specifically, whether they are strongly categorical—not the ontological question of whether such reasons exist. I then develop an argument in favour of the CG theorist's position by considering the moral error theorist's arguments in support of the conceptual claim that moral reasons are strongly categorical. These include, notably, criticisms made by Joyce [2011] and Olson [2014] of Finlay's [2008] ‘end relational’ view of morality, according to which moral reasons are relative to some end or standard, hence not strongly categorical. Examining these criticisms, I argue that, based on what moral error theorists have said regarding the conceptual profile of moral reasons, there is a strong case to be made that moral reasons are strongly categorical if and only if epistemic reasons are. (shrink)

The rapid development of large language models (LLM’s) and of their associated interfaces such as ChatGPT has brought forth a wave of epistemic and moral concerns in a variety of domains of inquiry...

The rapid expansion of computational tools and of data science methods in healthcare has, undoubtedly, raised a whole new set of bioethical challenges. As Laacke and colleagues rightly note,...

Within the climate justice debate, the ‘beneficiary pays’ principle holds that those who benefit from greenhouse emissions associated with industrialization ought to pay for the costs of mitigating and adapting to their adverse effects. This principle constitutes a claim of inter-generational justice, and it is widely believed that the non-identity problem raises serious difficulties for any such claim. After briefly sketching the rationale behind ‘beneficiary pays,’ this paper offers a new way of understanding the claim that persons in developed societies (...) have benefited from industrialization. It argues that when we think of the claim in this new way, it evades the non-identity problem entirely. Some objections to this approach are then considered and rebutted. The paper concludes by comparing the present, relatively modest solution to the nonidentity problem with a much more ambitious attempt from the recent literature. (shrink)

Background:A growing number of frameworks for the practice of clinical ethics are described in the literature. Among these, hermeneutical frameworks have helped highlight the interpretive and contextual nature of clinical ethics practice.Objectives:The aim of this article is to further advance this body of work by drawing on the ideas of Charles Taylor, a leading hermeneutical philosopher.Design/Findings:A Hermeneutical Rapprochement Framework is presented for clinical ethics practice, based on Taylor’s hermeneutical “retrieval” and “rapprochement.” This builds on existing hermeneutical approaches for the practice (...) of clinical ethics by articulating a framework with interpretive and reconciliatory scope that extends beyond the presenting “local” context. A Hermeneutical Rapprochement Framework considers broader socio-historical horizons and imaginaries grounded on Taylor’s expansive work in epistemological, ontological, political, and moral philosophy.Discussion:The framework is discussed in terms of how it can be operationalized for clinical practice as well as normative development. Implications for the educational preparation of clinical ethicists are also discussed. Although this work is directly relevant for clinical ethicists, it can also help inform the ethical practice of all clinicians. (shrink)

Spingersi ai confini dell'esperienza del corpo - amore, sofferenza, vecchiaia, morte - attraverso la letteratura, la filosofia, le arti figurative, eventi etico-politici e personali, frammenti di racconto.

1. La filosofia antica-India, Cina, Grecia -- 2. La filosofia tardo-antica e medioevale: ebraismo, cristianesimo, islamismo -- 3.1. La filosofia moderna: umanesimo, Riforma, rivoluzione scientifica (1350-1715) -- 3.2. La filosofia moderna: illuminismo, criticismo, idealismo (1715-1815) -- 4.1. La filosofia contemporanea: scientismi, sroticismi, irrazionalismi -- 4.2. La filosofia contemporanea: filosofie analitiche e continentali.

The integration of artificial intelligence into bioethics education represents a new pedagogical approach that addresses complex moral issues in healthcare. The use of AI-driven platforms like ChatGPT in bioethics education can enhance critical thinking and decision-making skills among students by providing a diverse range of perspectives and solutions. To assess the ability of ChatGPT-4 to understand and resolve ethical dilemmas using validated clinical case vignettes, thereby determining its suitability as a teaching aid in bioethics. Ten clinical scenarios, each with inherent (...) ethical issues, were presented to ChatGPT-4. These scenarios were expert-validated to ensure relevance and complexity. ChatGPT's responses were evaluated by two blinded external raters to eliminate bias. The assessment criteria included identification of bioethical principles, recognition of stakeholders and their outcomes, and comprehension of ethical and legal frameworks. Additionally, the quality of responses was scored on a scale of 1–10. ChatGPT showed proficiency in identifying the pertinent bioethical principles and stakeholders involved in the ethical dilemmas presented. It achieved an overall score of 84.5%, with high marks for its analytical capabilities in complex scenarios. However, the study identified areas for improvement, particularly in proposing comprehensive solutions and alternative actions. ChatGPT demonstrates potential as an effective tool for bioethics education, capable of guiding learners through the resolution of ethical issues in clinical practice. However, to fully integrate ChatGPT into bioethics education, it requires enhancements in delivering detailed, actionable guidance in ethical decision-making. Future development should focus on refining ChatGPT’s ability to offer nuanced solutions aligned with patient values and clinician needs. (shrink)

In this article I argue for an interpretive approach to bioethics with critically ill children. I begin by highlighting the dominant Anglo-American bioethical framework that defines standards for ethical care in critically ill children and then outline a critique of this framework. Drawing predominantly on the ideas of Charles Taylor, Michael Walzer and Richard Zaner, I call for a reconception of bioethics and propose an interpretive ‘thick’ framework that is centred on culture and context. Finally, I illustrate this interpretive approach (...) through a comparative study of two cases in pediatric intensive care: the narratives of Marc and Larry. These case studies reveal that ethical dilemmas in pediatric critical care can be traced to relational tensions over respect, trust and power rooted in the disparity of moral horizons among the persons involved. (shrink)